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a gratuitous bailee, for his misfeasances has been put on the ground
of contract, and that contract founded on a fictitious consideration.Legal rights may be classified according to their nature or their
remedies. The .promises of competent parties*which include the
elements of mutual lenefit and mutual assent originate rights to
which the denomination of contracts is given. The appropriate
remedies which are used to enforce *them are afterwards found
applicable to rights of another nature, which are then included
under the. same denomination of contracts-t]be elements in
which they are deficient being supplied by fictions. The action
of a8sump8it, founded on a promise which is ayerred, may be
brought against the husband for necessaries furnished to his wife
for whom he has refused to provide without just cause, even in spite
of his express prohibition. The same action may be brought against
a gratuitous bailee for an injury done to the property intrusted to,
him. Such fictions are convenieut. but it is always worth inquiry
whether a classification has been determined by the law of right or
-by the law of remedy.1
Cincinnati, 0., ApriZ, 1854.

-RECENT AMERICAN
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DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1853.
THE EXECUTORS OF JOHN WDONOGH,

DECEASED, ET* AL., AP'TS, VS.

MARY MURDOCK, ET AL,., HEMS OF JOHN M'DONOGH, DECEASED.

1. A testator, residing in Louisiana, and leaving there a large succession by his
ifl, after particular legacies, gave all the residue and remainder of his estate,
real and personal, of whatever nature, (subject to certain annuities,)'"to the
corporations of the cities of New Orleans and Baltimore forever, one-half to each,',
for intents and purposes afterwards declared. He then directed his executors to
convert all his personal estate into realty, whereby the whole of his estate should
1 21 Am. Jur. 260-.
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become a permanent fund in real estate, "no part of which shall ever be touched,
divided, sold or aliquated, but shall forever remain together as one estate, and be
managed" as he should order. For the management of this estate, he directed
the cities each to select, annually, three agents, whose duty it should be to receive
seisin and possession of the estate from his executors immediately after his death.
They were to lease or rent the lots, cultivate plantations, collect rents, pay the
annuities, and, "in fine, to do all acts necessary to its perfect management
according to the will;" it being the will of the testator "that no part of the
general estate, or revenue from rents arising from said general estate, should go
ifito the hands of the corporate authorities of the said cities, but that the
said authorities should have forever the uperviTion of it." The relations
thus established between the cities and the agents were to be perpetual; no
alteration could be made, or sale or traffic or surrender of or in the interests qr
powers given. In case of any combination to violate the provisions of the scheme
of management, the "general estate" was limited over to the States of Louisiana
and Maryland, "for the purpose of educating the poor of those States." He
further provided, that if there should be "a lapse of the legacies from a failure
to accept% or any other cause or means whatsoever," the shares should enure for
the benefit of the State or States in which the cities are situated, that the
Legislatures 'thereof might carry his intentions into effect. The testator then
provided a minute and detailed scheme, in particular for the expenditure of the
revenues of the estates. One-eighth part of the annual income for forty years to
the Colonization Society; three-eighths, to be accumulated in a particular manner, for the founding of certain charitable institutions. The remainder of the
income, and the whole, after the first objects were fulfilled, were for the fred education of the poor of the cities of New Orleans and Baltimore. The design of the
will, as appeared from its whole tenor, was to create a perpetual foundation,
without powers of alienation or sale. ZTed:
I. That the cities were legatees by title universal; the mode of administration
of the legacy being governed, however, by the plan established by the testator.
II. That the cities, as such, were entitled to take as legatees;. and that the
purposes of the legacy were not such, in general, as to disentitle them to hold.
III. That the dispositions of the will were not within the prohibition against
substitutions and fidei commissa in the Art. 1607 of the Civil Code of Louisiana.
IV. That the testator had authority to define the uses and destination of his
legacy.
V. That the prohibitions in the will against alienation and division, so far as
they were illegal, were merely void in themselves, and did not vitiate the other
dispositions of the will.
VL That the fact of the uses for the benefit of the city of Baltimore being
foreign to the State of Louisiana, did not affect their validity.
VIL That if the annuities for accumulation first given were void, which was
not determined, they would merely sink for the benefit of the legatees.
VIII. And that even had the prior dispositions been invalid, the limitation over
to the States of Louisiana and Maryland was good.
26
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2. Corporations in Louisiana may receive legacies for purposes not foreign to their
institution.
8. The fidel commiwa prohibited in the civil code are only substitutionary limitations of property, and have xio analogy to common law trusts.
4. The provision of the 'civil code (art. 2026) that "impossible conditions, those
which are contrary to laws or morals, are to be reputed not written," while
applicable to all ntedes of appropriation, use or destination, of-property, by contract or legacy, in cases of legacies merely annuls the condition, without affecting
the validity of the donation itself.
5. A legacy may be made of property in Louisiana, to &.corporation existing in and
created by the laws of another State.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States fol! the
Eastern District of Louisiana.
This was a bill of equity filed by the. heirs of John MoDonogh,
deceased, against his executors and irustees, to set aside a certain
will made by him, on the ground of the illegality of its dispositions,
and to have the decedent declared intestate.
The court below decreed in favor of the complainants.
-Mr. Justice

CAmpBEuL

delivered the opinion of this Court.

-The appellees are the heirs at law of John .McDonogh, a native
of the State of Maryland, who died at MeDonogh, near New Orleans,
in the State of Louisiana, in 1850, leaving there a very large succession. In 1839, the decedent executed' at New Orleans an olographic will for the disposal of the estate he might have at his
death. This will is in a legal form, and has been admitted to
probate in the District Court of New Orleans. It contains two
particular legacies which are not contested, and a single legacy
under a universal title. In this bequest the testator declares "that
for the more general diffusion of knowledge, and consequent well
being, of mankind," and, "being convinced that he could make no
disposition of those goods which the Most High had placed under
his stewardship, as by means of which the poor will be instructed in
wisdom and led into -the path of holiness," "he gives, wills and
bequeaths all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate,, real and
personal, present and future, as well that which was then his as
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that which he might acquire at any time before his death, and of
which he might die possessed, (subject to certain annuities,) to the
corporations of the cities of New Orleans and Baltimore forever,
one-half to each," "to and for the several intents and purposes
thereafter declared." The testator directs his executors to convert
his personal estate into real property, whereby " the whole of his
estate will become a permanent fund in real estate, affording rents,
no part of which. shall ever be touched, divided, sold or alienated,
but shall forever remain together as one estate, and be managed"
as he shall order.
For the management of this estate, thus declared to be inalienable, he directs the two cities each to select, annually, three agents,
whose duty it should be to receive seisin and possession of the estate
fiom his executors, immediately after his death. They are "to
lease or rent the lots, cultivate the plantations, collect the rents,
pay the annuities, invest the moneys, and, in fine, .do all acts necessary to its full and perfect management, according to the will ;"
the will of the testator being "that no part of.the GENERAL ESTATE,
or revenue from rents arising from said GENERAL ESTATB, shall go
into the hands of the corporate authorities of the said cities, but
that the said authorities should have forever the SUPERVISION of it."
The testator designed the joint management of the agents of the
cities, and -the joint supervision of their authorities over the estate, to
be perpetual. He forbids the cities to vary by agreementor by any
compromise, the relations he has established between them in regard
to it. They must make no sale of their interests; no traffic with their
powers of control, no surrender formoney or other consideration of
their supervisory care. But, should they combine to violate his
scheme of management or appropriation, their rights are declared forfeited, and "the general estate" is limited over to the States of Louisiana and Maryland, "for the purpose of educating the poor of those
States," "under such a general system of education as their legislatures
should appoint." He further provides, that should there be "a lapse
of the legacies from the failure of the legatees to accept, or any other
cause or means whatsoever," the shares should enure for the benefit

ef the State or States in which the cities are situate; "that the legisla-
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tures of those States respectively may carryhis intentions as expressed
and set forth in the will into effect, as far and in the manner which
will appear to them iaost proper."
The testator having provided for the perpetuity of the MeDonogh
estate, and the destination of its revenues, proceeds to develope a minute and detailed scheme for its management, improvement, 'and the
expenditure of its income. He appropiiates one-eighth part of its annual revenue for forty years for colonizing the free people of color, to the
American Colonization Society, the sum not to exceeda$25,000 per
annum; one-eighth part for the erection in New Orleans of an asylum
for the poor of all ages,.castes, and colors; one-eighth part to an incorporated society for the relief of orphan boys in New Orleans; and oneeighth part for the establishment of a school farm in Maryland. The
money appropriated to the asylum, school farm, and orphan boys,
he requires to be invested as capital in real estate, and the rents
only to be subject, to the uses of the donees. The capital of the
asylum and school farm is to be entirely collected before any appropriation takes place for their use; and for the one the capital is to
be $3,000,000, and for the other, $600,000. The remaining foureights of the income of the general estate for the present, and the
whole after the objects above mentioned are fulfilled,'.are destined
"tor- the education of the poor, without the cost of a cent to them,
in the cities of New Orleans and Baltimore and their respective
suburbs, in such a manner that every poor child and youth of every
color in those places may receive a common English edacation L
based, however, beit particularly understood, on a moral and religious one ;" the whole of the general estate "to form a fund in real
estate which shall never be sold or alienated, but be held and remain
forever sacred."
To carry his purposes into effect he directs the selection of boards
of managers for te different establishments, and suggests that acts
of incorporation may become necessary to facilitate their operations.
The appellees claim that as to the property embraced in this bequest to the cities, that. John McDonogh died intestate.
Their argument is, that although he makes in the commencement
of his will a formal gift to the cities; although the cities are desig-
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nated as his legatees in several clauses of the will in precise terms;
although the property is described as property "willed and bequeathed to the cities," that the testator has sedulously contrived to
withdraw from them the seisin and possession of the whole estate,
and has committed them to an uncertain and fluctuating board, for
the selection of which he has provided; that the dominion and use
of this property, in so far as he has permitted either, has been confided to this board of managers, but that this board is held servilely
to a code -of regulations he has dictated, the aim of which is to hold
the "11cDonoghestate" together in perpetuity; that by these restrictive regulations the donations to the cities have become nugatory
and unavailing.
This'conclusion was adopted by the Circuit Court, whose decree
is under revisal, and has been sustained in the argument at the bar
of this Court with great power end ability.
We may- remark of the will of the testator, that it indicates his
imagination to have become greatly disturbed by a long and earnest
contemplation of plans which he says "had actuated and filled his
soul from early boyhood with a desire to acquire a fortune, and which
then occupied his whole soul, desires, and affections." In the effort
to accomplish these cherished hopes he has overstepped the limits
which the laws have imposed upon the powers of ownership, overlooked the practical difficulties which surround the execution of
complex, arrangements for the administration of property, greatly
exaggerated the value of his estate; and unfolded plans far beyond
its resources to effect; and has forgotten that false calculations,
mismanagement, or unfaithfulness might occur to postpone or prevent their attainment. Holding, and declaring a firm faith in the
interposition of Providence to render his enterprise successful, he
apparently abandons himself, without apprehension or misgiving, to
the contemplation of the "McDo'nogh estate," as existing through
all time, without any waste or alienation, but improving and enlarging, "extending the blessings of education to the poor, through
every city, town, and hamlet" of the State where he was born, and
the State in which he had lived and was to die; "rescuing from ignorance and idleness, vice and ignominy, millions upon millions of
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the destitute youth of the cities," and "serving to bind communities and States in -the bonds of brotherly love and affection
forever.'
The exaggeration which is apparent in the scheme he projects,
and the ideas he expresses concerning it, afford the ground of the
argument for the appellees. It is, however, unfair to look to the
parts of the will which relate to the disorders which reign in soeiety,
or to his aspirations to furnish a relief for these "during all time,"
or to the prophetic visions awakened by the exalted and exciting
ideas which dictated the conditions of the will, for the rule of its
interpretation. We must look to the conveyances he has made in
the instrument, the objects they are fitted to accomplish, and the

agencies, if any, to be employed, and endeavor to frame these into
a consistent and harmoniois, plan, accordant with his leading and
controlling intentions. In reference to his controlling purpose there
can beno mistake. He says, "that the first, principal and chief
object" in his view is "t1te education of the poor" of the two cities.
With equal emphasis .and .precision le hag disclaimed- the desire 6f
building the fortunes of his natural relations, He says, "that even
to his children' if he had them, (as he has not.,) and a fortune to
leave behind him, he would, besides a virtuous education, to effect
which nothing should be spared, bequeath to each but -a very small
amount, merely to excite them to habits of industry and frugality,
and no more."
His ruling purpose had no connexion with the poor of any one
generation. His desire was to establish a foundation to exist for
all time-a perpetuity.
He knew that to attain this purpose a succession of persousanimated with a corresponding aim must be obtained, and that the
legal capacities of voluntary associations, even if he could hope to
find such.to enter into his plans, were wholly unfitted for his design;
nor aid he hope to effectually coinbine such persons by any power
or prayer of his own. Hence, he selected as hig devisees bodies
corporate, endowed with the -faculties of acquiring and holding
property, having determinate ends and abiding agencies to be
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employed in accomplishing them. These were all requisite for the
full attainment of the purposes he has declared.
He excludes, it is true, the munincipal authorities from the
particular management of the estate, or the application of its
revenues.
But, the munincipal officers are not his legatees. They are
themselves but agents clothed with a temporary authority ; nor do
the officers perform their executive duties, except by the interposition of agents *subordinate to their control and subject to their
supervision. Had the testator confined himself to an unconditional
donation of the general estate to the cities, for the use of public
schools, it would scarcely have fallen under the personal management of the corporate authorities. They would probably have
appointed boards or agencies, to whom powers, more or less general
would have been confided, and over whose conduct their supervision
would have been more or less particular and exact. The knowledge
of this probably induced the testator to describe the board which
his experience and observation had marked as the most efficient and
responsible. He defines their number, the manner of their appointment, the form of their accounts, the modes of their business, and
urgently exacts that the great, and to his eyes, sacred interests of
his charity should not be blended with the vulgar and debauching
concerns of daily corporate management. These directions must
be regarded as. subsidiary to the general objects of his will, and
whether legal and practicable, or otherwise, can exert no influence
over the question of its validity. Nor do we esteem the facts, that
he has given his estate a name, regards it as a distinct entity, and
couples with it language denoting perpetuity, important as evidence
that the cities are not his legatees. A gift to a munincipal corporation tends to create a perpetuity. Property thus held ceases to be
the subject of donation, or of devise, of transfer by bankruptcy, or
in the order of succession. The property of such a corporation is
rarely the subject of sale, and practically it is ort of commerce.
McDonogh buppo3ed that he could prohibit any alienation or
division. We do not perceive therefore, why he should have sought
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an incorporation of the general estate; nor do we understand that
this forms a prominent portion of his scheme.
The will, through every part, discloses that the cities are the
particular objects of his interest; and the poor of the cities of his
providence and bounty. His will designates the cities, by their
corporate name, as his legatees, in definite and legal language. His
plan of administration is to be executed through agents, selected
by their corporate anthorities, and to the end of conveying to the
poor of the cities, perpetually, .the fruits of his property. We
should violate authoritative rules of legal interpretation, were we to
disi herit the cities under these circumstances, and to substitute for
them "an ideal being" called the "general estate," having no legal
capacity, nor juridical character, and whose recognition, therefore,
could have no result but to overturn the will of the testator.
(C. C. 1706; 1 Spence Eq. J. 529, 530; 5-Ann. R. 557.)
Having thus determined that the legacy is to the cities by a
universal title, and having extracted from the will the leading and
controlling intention of the testator,the next inquiry is, whether a.
legacy given for such objects is valid ?

The Roman: jurisprudenc.e, upon which that of Louisiana is
founded, seems originally to have denied. to cities a'capacity to
inherit, or even to take by donation or legacy.. They were treated
as composed of uncertain persons, who could not perform the acts
of volition and personality involved in the acceptance of a succession. The disability was removed by the Emperor Adrian in regard
to donations and legacies, and, soon, legacies ad ornatum civitatis
and ad honorem civitatis became frequent. Legacies for thd relief
of the poor, aged, and helpless, and for the education of children,
were ranked of the latter class. This capacity was enlarged by the
Christian emperors, and after the time of Justinian.there was no
impadiment. Doiiations for charitable uses were then favored, and
this favorable legislation was diffused over Europe by the canon
law; so that it became the common law of Christendom. When the
power of the 6lergy began to arouse the jealousy of the temporal
authority, and it became a policy.to check their influence and
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wealth-they being for the most part the managers of property thus
appropriated-limitations, upon the capacity of donors to make
such gifts, were first imposed. These commenced in England in the
time of Henry III.; but the learned authors of the history of the
corporations of that realm affirm that cities were not included in
them-"perhaps upon the ground that the grants were for the
public good ;" and although "the same effect was produced by the
grant in perpetuity to the inhabitants," "the same practical inconvenience did noi arise from it, nor was it at the time considered a
mortmain." (Mereweth. & Steph. "Hist. Corp. 489, 702.)
A century later, there was a direct inhibition upon grants- to
cities, boroughs, and others which have- a perpetual commonalty,
and others "which have offices perpetual," and therefore "be as
perpetual as people of religion." The English statutes of mortmain forfeit to the king or superior lord the estates granted, which
right is to- be exerted by entry; a license therefore from the king
severs the forfeiture. The legal history of the continent on this
subject does not materially vary from that of England. The same
alterations of favor, encouragement, jealousy, restraint, and prohibition are discernible. The Code Napoleon, maintaining the spirit
of the ordinances of the monarchy in 1731, 1749, 1762, provides
"that donations during- life or by will for the benefit of hospitals,
of the poor of a commune, or of establishments of public utility,
shall not take effect, except so far as they shall be authorized by
an ordinance of the Government."
The learned Savigny, writing for Germany, says-" If modern
legisla.tion, for reasons of policy or political economy, have restrained
conveyances in mortmain, that those restrictions formed no part of
the common law." The laws of Spain contain no material change
of the Roman and Ecclesiastical laws upon this subject. The reports of the Supreme Court of Louisiana (in which State these laws
were long in force) attest their favor to such donations. Pontalba
vs. New Orleans, 8 Ann. 660.
This legislation of Europe was directed to check the wealth and
influence of juridical persons who had existed for centuries there,
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some of whom had outlived the necessities which had led to their
organization and endowment. Political reasons entered largely into
the motives for this legislation-reasons which never have extended
their influence to this continent, and consequently it has not been
introduced into our systems of jurisprudence. (2 Kent's Comm.
282-3; Wiicker vs. Rurne, 14 Beav. 509.)
The precise result of the legislation is, that corporations there,
with the capacity of acquiring property, must derive their capacity
from the sovereign authority, and the practice is to limit that general capacity'within narrow limits, or to subject each acquisition to
the revisal of the sovereign. We have examined the legislation of
the European States, so as better to appreciate that of Louisiana.
No corporation can exist in Louisiana-,-have a public characterappear in courts of justice-exercise rights as a political body, except by legislative authority; and each may be dissolved when
deemed necessary or convenient to the public interest. Corporations created bylaw are permitted to possess an estate, receive donations and legacies, make valid obligations and contracts, and manage
their own business. (Civ. Cod. tit. 10, ch. 1,. 2, 3, art. 418,
et seq.)
The privileges which thus belohg to corporations legally existing
have' been granted to the inhabitants of New Orleans in various
legislative acts. The authorities of the city have besides received
powers of government extending to all subjects affecting their order,
tranquility, and improvement. It is agreed that these powers are
limited to the objects for which they are granted, and cannot be employed for ends foreign to the corporation. (1 Paige, 214; 15

New H. 317; 4 S. & S. C. R. 156; 3 Ann. 294.)
But there can be no question as to the degree of appreciation in
which the subject of education is held in Louisiana. .The constitution of the State imposes upon the Legislature the duty of providing public schools for gratuitous education; and various acts attest
the zeal of that department in performing that public duty. Among
these, there ii one which authorizes and requires the corporate
authorities of the city of New Orleans to establish them in that city,
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and to enact ordinances for their organization, government and dis-.
cipline; they are likewise charged with the instruction, education,
and reformation of juvenile delinquents and vagrants. These acts
are from a sovereign authority, and endue the city with the powers
of acquiring, retaining, and disposing of property, without limitation as to value, and assign to it, as on~e of its municipal functions,
the charge of popular education. No parliamentary grant or royal
license in Great Britain-no government ordinance in Francecould remove more effectually a disability, if one existed, or create
a capacity, if one were wanting, to the corporations of those countries. (Revised Stat. La. 41, 111, 116, 117, 144, 289; 2 Rob.
244, 491.)
We shall now examine the devise to the cities, in connexion with
the various conditions annexed to it. The appellees insist it is a
disposition reprobated by law, for that it contains "1substitutions
and fidei commissa," which are prohibited by art. 1507 of the code,
and which annul the donation in which they are found.
.Weshall not inquire whether the prohibition extends to donations
in favor of corporations, and for objects of public utility, though
this seems to have been a question in France. - (Lefeb. des Don.
Pieuses, 31, 33.)
We shall limit the inquiry to the nature of the prohibited estates
to determine whether they exist in this legacy. The terms ilre of
Roman origin, and were applied to modes of donation by will, common during its empire, and from thence were transferred to the derivative systems of law in use upon the.continent of Europe. The
substitute was a person appointed by the testator to take the inheritance, in case of the incapacity or refusal of the instituted heir.
A pater famiias was authorized to make the will of his son during
his nonage, or lunaiy, or other incapacity to perform the act; and
in the case of his death, under such circumstances, the appointee
took the succession. This was a mode of substitution.
The fidei commissum originated in a prayer, petition, or request,
of a testator upon his instituted heir, to deliver the inheritance, or
some portion of it, to a designated person. Every testament being
-
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originally a law of succession, proposed by the testator, and con
sented to by the Roman people-the language of legislation-that
*is, of mandate and authority-was essential to its validity. Precatory -words were insufficient to raise an obligation upon the heir, or
t6 vest preperty i the donee. This was afterwards changed, and
words of request then imposed a charge upon the heir, to maintain
the faith in which the testator had confided. Afterwards, the' distinctions between words of mandate and of requestbecame obsolete,
and both were considered, with reference to their significance of the
intentions of 'the testator. The notion of a fidei commissum thus
became limited, implying no more than an estate in'possession, encumbered with the charge to surrender it to another. This might
be pure and simple-that is, the duty to surrender might be immediate, or it might be on a -condition, or after the expiration of a
term even extending to the life of the gravatus. The substitute
originally came in the place of another-the idea was modified to
include those who came after another under certain circumstances.
The conjunction of the fidei commissum with the substitution
would then become a natural mode of gettlement of property, The
instituted heir might be charged to hold and enjoy the succession
for his life, and at his death. that it should go to another, (his heir,)
and"that heir might in turn become. a gravatus, for the benefit of
another successor, and so from generation -o generation.
Such a substitution might be properly called a "substitution fidei
commissaire," or an " oblique substitution." This mode of limiting
estates from degree to degree, and generation to generation, was
much employed on the continent of Europe, and served to accumulate wealth in a few families, at the expense of the interests of the
community. The vices of the system were freely exposed by the
political writeis of the lagt century, and a general antipathy
awakened against it. , Substitutions having this object were prohibited during thd revolution' in France, and that prohibition was
continued in the Code Napoleon, whose authors have exposed with
masterly abiity the evils which accompanied them. Motifs et Dis.
375.
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This prohibition was transferred to the code of Louisiana, with
the addition of the fidei commissa. These terms imply a disposition of property through a succession of donees. The substitution
of the article 1507 of the code being an estate for life, to be followed by a continuing estate in another by the appointment of the
testator.
The fidei commissa of the Louisiana code are estates of a similar nature, implying a limitation over from one to another. They
are the fidei conimissa of the Spanish and French laws, in so far
as those estates are not tolerated by other articles of the code. We
shall not attempt to define them from an examination of the code
and the reports of the Supreme Court of that State. It is not necessary for the decision of this case. We are unable to perceive
anything in the code to justify the supposition that the English
system of trusts, whether in its limited signification as applied in
conveyancing, or in its broad and comprehensive import as applied
by the courts of chancery, were within the purview of the authors
of this code in framing this prohibition. The terms substitution and
fidei commisga are words foreign to the English law. They are applied to no legal relation which exists in it, and describe nothing
which forms a part of it. The technical words of "charged to preserve and to render," in article 1507, which embrace so much to a
continental1 lawyer, only provoke inquiries in the mind of one accustomed to the language of common law. The allusion to the
"Trebellianic portion" is to a right of which there has never been
The whole article refers eta counterpart in the English system.
The estates known as
origin.
a
continental
elusively to things of
fidei commissa and substitutions, in so far as regards the order of
persons and the duration of their interest, may be created by devise in an English will. This can be done without the interposition
of trustees or with them. That is, legal estates or equitable estates
can be limited to embody those conditions of the fidei commissa and
substitution; but the separation of the same estate into parts, legal
and equitable, with separate courts in which their respective qualities
may be represented, is not of continental origin. We may say of this
as Sir Win. Grant says of another doctrine of equity, "that in its
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causes, its objects, its provisions, its qualifications, an4 its exceptions,
it is a law wholly English." We find nothing of the fidei commissa or
substitution in the legacy to the cities. The mischief resulting from
conveyances in mortmain, and which led to restraints upon them,
also existed in the substitutions of the French law, and led to their
suppression. The remedies for the mischief, in consequence of the
difference of the persons, were essentially variant. In the case of
natural persons, the abrogation of the capacity to limit property
from successor to successor, and generation to generation, removed
the-evil of perpetuities. But no statute against eiktates tail, or of
remainder, or reversion, operate upon a corporation. The mischief
results from the duration of the corporation and the tenacity with
which, from its nature, it holds to "property. The fee simple estate
to a corporation is that which most effectually promotes the creation
of a perpetuity. The remedy in Europe in this case was to restrict
the number of corporations, and to reserve an oversight of their
acquisitions to the sovereign authority. This precaution was taken,

as we have seen, also in Louisiana.

If she has granted to her me-

tropolis an unrestricted license to acquire and to hold property, we

must conclude there were sufficient motives to justify the act.
Our next inquiry will be, whether the testator is authorized to
defin6 the use and destination of his legacy. We have seen that
donations to the cities of the Roman empire followed immediately
upon the senatus consultum which allowed them to take, and that
the destination of such donations to public uses was declared. Domiat says, "One can bequeath and devise to a city or other corporation whatsoever, ecclesiastical or lay, and appropriate the gift to
some lawful and honorable purpose, or for public works, for feeding
the poor, or for other objects of piety or benevolence." Domat,
Lois Civiles, b. 4, tit. 2, §2.
The city of New Orleans holds its public squares, hospitals,
levees, cemeteries and libraries by such dedications. This court
says, (New Orlean8 vs. U. S., 10 Peters, 662,) "That property
may be dedicated to public use is a well-established principle of the
common law. It is founded in public convenience, and has been
sanctioned by the experience of ages. Indeed, without such a prin-
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ciple it would be difficult, if not impracticable, for society in a state
of advanced civilization to enjoy those advantages which belong to
its condition and which are essential to its accommodation."
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in a number of cases have applied the principle contained in these citations with confidence.
.Pontalbavs. New Orleans, 3 An., 662; Will of Mary, 2 Rob., 440;
.Dukeof Bich. vs. kylne, 17 Lous. 312; Maryland and Louisiana vs. Roselius, MSS.
The code of Louisiana provides that donations made for the benefit of an hospital of the poor of the community, or of establishments of public utility, shall be accepted by the administrator of
such establishments. (C.C., 1536.) It may be very true this
article relates merely to the formal manner by which donations,
inter vivos, for such objects may be perfected; but it will be observed that the requiement of the French code of a government
license for. the gift is dispensed with in the frame of this article,
and a strong implication arises from its terms in favor of the validity of such gifts. An acceptance of such donations in a will is
unnecessary. Nor do we see any ground for inferring a prohibition
of donations by will, which are lawful, inter vivos, in the'absence
of any prohibitive article in the code. We are of the opinion,
therefore, that the testator might declare the uses to which he destined his legacy to the cities; and the destination, being for purposes within the range of the powers and duties of its public authorities, is valid.
We shall now examine the question whether the conditions annexed to this legacy-the prohibition to alienate-or to divide the
estate-or to separate in its management the interest of the citiesor their care and control-or to deviate from the testator's scheme,
invalidate the bequest.
The appellees contend that the performance of these conditions is
impossible; they are contrary to public policy; introduce tenures
at variance with the laws, and would result in mischief to the State.
That the conditions are of the essence of the gift, and the will
would not conform to the dispositions of the testator if they should
be erased or disregarded. They insist that the appellees take by
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virtue of the law, but the devisees claim under a will. That if they
cannot exhibit -a clear and valid devise of the property, the legal
right of the heir should not be defeated. That this court cannot,
under the guise of judicial construction, sanction an instrument
from which the main prescriptions of the testator are obliterated.
The argument on this'point against the cities possesses great
l6gical force. It is admitted that illegal or immoral conditions Will
vitiate a contract; (C. C., 2026,) but the code provides that "in all
dispositions inter vivos and mortis causa, impossible conditions, those
which are contrary to the laws or to the morals, are repited not
written." The authorities cited establish that, under the word
"conditions," the various modes of appropriation, use, and destination attached to this legacy are included. Merlin says, "conditions
take different names according. to their object; they are called in
turn charges, destinations, motives, designations, terms. But
although the conditions, charges, destinations, &c., &c., ought to be
distinguished, nevertheless -the word condition often serves to
express them all." Merlin's Rep., Cond. § 2.
The signification of this article of the code beconies then an
important inquiry. It is found in the Digest of Justinian, and
from thence passed into the codes of France and Spain. Touil. 5,
No. 255. L*Escrich. Dic. leg., 565. It was copied from the -Code
Napoleon into the code of Louisiana. Savigny furnishes us with
the history of the law as found in the Pandects. One of the schools
into which the Roman jurisconsults was divided (Proculeians) placed
the construction of contracts and testaments -containing illegal or
impossible conditions on the same principle, and insisted that the
whole disposition in each should be vitiated by them; another
(Sabinians) changed the rule with reference to the instrument, and
while contracts were vitiated by the illegal or immoral conditions,

in wills the conditions only were pronounced nugatory. 'Justinian
adopted the opinion of the latter, which seems to have been preferred in practice before; and his adoption has been regarded as a
legislative sahetion of. their rule in favor of testaments. Great
authorities in France oppose this doctrine, and in Prussia it exists,
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but in a modified form, while it has been wholly rejected in Austria.
(5 Toul., No. 247; Savig. Rom. Law, § 122-3-4.)
The commonlaw rule depends upon the fact whether the performance of the illegal, immoral, or impossible condition is prescribed as
precedent or subsequent to the vesting of the estate of the devisee.
In the former case no estate exists till the condition is performed,
and no right can be claimed through an illegal or immoral act. In
the latter case, the estate remains, becausd it cannot be defeated as
a consequence o'f the fulfilment of an illegal or immoral -condition.
This, however, applies only to devises of -real estate. For the
ecclesiastical and chancery courts in regard to bequests of per.onalty follow the rule of the civil law as above expressed. (1 Rop.
Leg. 754-5; 7 Beav. 437; 1 Eden. R. 140; 2 Spence Eq. J.
229.)
The conditions in the case before us which impose restraints
upon alienation and partition, and exact a particular management
through agents of a specified description, are conditions subsequent,
and would not by the rule of the common law divest the estate, if
pronounced to be illegal or immoral. (3Pet. S. C. R. 877; 1
Sim. R.N. S., 464: 7 E. L & Eq. 179; 2 J. C. Scott, C B. R.
883; 2 Zabriskie R. 117; 10 Ala. R. 702.)
These conditions belong, too, to the class that are reprobated as
repugnant to the legal rights which the law attaches to ownership.
The common law pronounces such conditions void in consequence
of that repugnancy, and the civil law treats *them as recommendations and counsel, not designed to control the will of the donee.

(1 Rop. Leg. 785; 4 Kent's Com. 130; Toul. 5, No. 51; Toul. 4,
No. 405; Dalloz. Die., tit. Cond. 96; 10 E. L. & E. R. 23.)
Our opinion upon the article of the code we have cited is, that it
does not prescribe a rule. of interpretation to aid the understanding
of the courts in finding the intention of a testator, but that it is a
peremptory enactment of the legislative' authority, applicable to the
subject-matter in all cases, without reference to any declared. or
presumed intentions of the author of a particular donation. The
code treats such conditions in contracts as the wrong of both the
parties, and annuls the act. In the case of the testament, while it
27
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refuses, to allow the condition, it saves to the innocent legatee the
disposition in his favor. It may be that this is done on the presumption that, independent of the condition, the legatee is the
favorite of the testator, or from a consideration of the legatee
alone. Savigny Ron. Law, § 122, et seq.
We have thus far treated the cities a occupying an equal position,
and have considered the case with reference to the city of New
Orleans alone.
The city of Baltimore is legally incorporated and endowed with
the powers usually granted- to populous and imptoving cities. The
general assembly of Maryland, in 1825, authorized the city to
establish public schools and to collect. taxes for their support ; and in

1842, it was empowered to receive in trust, and to control for the
purposes of the trusts, any property which might be bestowed upon
it, by gift or will, for any of its general corporate purposes, or in
aid of the indigent and poor, or for the general purposes of education, or for charitable purposes of .any description whatsoever,
within its limits. The legal capacity of the city, therefore, corresponds with that of the city of New Orleans.,' Do the laws of
Louisiana make a discrimination?
The code declares "that all persons may dispose of or receive by
donations, inter vivos or mortis causa, except -such as the law
declares exprae8ly.incapable."
(C. C. 1456.) There is no distinc.
tion between corporations and natural persons in. the power to
receive by donation, nor do we find any discrimination between
domestic and foreign corporations, except, perhaps, in a single
article. "Donations may be made in favor of a stranger, when the
laws of his country do not prohibit similar dispositions in favor of a
citizen of this State." C. C., 1477.
We greatly doubt whether this article applies at all .to the citizens
or corporations of the States of the Union. The constitutional relations between the citizens of the different- States are those of
equality, in reference to the subject of this article. This court, in
the case of the Bank of Augu8ta vs. Earle, (13 Peters, 520,) said,
'"that by the law of comity among .nations, a corporation created
by one sovereignty is permitted to make contracts in another, and
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to sue in its courts; and that the same law of comity prevails among
the several sovereignties of the Union. This comity is presumed
from the silent acquiescence of the State. Whenever a State sufficiently indicates that contracts which derive validity from its comity
are repugnant to its policy, or are considered as injurious to its interests, the presumption in favor of its adoption can no longer be
made.
These principles were applied to a purchase of lands by the corporation of one State in another. (Runyon vs. Coster, 14 Peters,

122.)
The principles of these cases have been adopted in Louisiana.
(4 Rob. La..R. 517; 17 La. R. 46, 312.)
We know of no departure from these principles in Maryland, and
do not doubt that the corporations of Louisiana would take in the
same manner as those of Maryland in that State.
The question remains to be considered whether the destination of
the legacy to public uses in the city of Baltimore affects the valid
operation of the bequest. All the property of a corporation like
Baltimore is held for public uses, and when the capacity is conferred
or acknowledged to it to hold property, its destination to a.public
use is necessarily implied." Nor can we perceive why a designation
of the particjilar use if -within the general objects of the corporation can affect the result; nor is there anything in the nature of
the uses declared in this will which can withdraw from the legacy a
legal protection.
Neither do we concede that the uses, being in a degree foreign to
the State of Louisiana, impair the effect of the will. It is well
settled, that where property is conveyed to a use which would be
protected, if to be executed at home, in the absence of a prohibition;
the conveyance would be valid if the execution were ordered to take
place abroad. This question was considered by Mr. Justice Story,
in the opinion prepared by him for the case of the Baptist Association vs. Smith, published in 3 Peters, 482, 500.
He says, "there is no statute of Virginia making such bequests
void; and, therefore, if against her policy, it can only be becatise it
would be against the general policy of all States governed by the
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common law." He concludes: "there is no solid objection to the
bequest founded upon the objects being foreign to the State of Virginia." In the late case 'Whicker vs. flume, 14 Beavan, 509, on
appeal, 16 Jurist, 391, a bequest to trustees, to be appropriated in
their absolute and uncontrolled discretion, for the benefit and advancement and propagation of learning in every part of the world,
as far as circumstances will permit,'; was pronounced valid. We
find nothing in the code of. Louisiana indicating a spirit less comprehensive or catholic; we shall not, therefore, infer the existence
of a restriction -where none has been declared. We are of the
opinion that the uses for which the testator has devised his estate to
the city of Baltimore, are approved alike in the legislation of
Louisiana and Mlaryland, and that the execution of them may be enforced in their courts.
We have considered the legacy without a reference to the annuities which the testator has charged upon it. It is only necessary
for us to determine a single question in regard to them. Are the
heirs at law interested in the question of their legality ?
The civil code (C. C. 2697) declare, "that legatees under an universal title, and legatees under a particular title, benefit by tle
failure of those particular legacies which they ate bound to dis1
charge."
It will be seen that all the annuitants, .having a distinct character from the cities, have a claim upon them for their annual allowance. Should these annuities be invalid, this charge would be
removed, and the cities relieved. Such was the- decision of the
Sup. Court of Louisiana, (Prevo8t vs. Martel, 10 Rob. 512,) and
such the conclusion of the court of Cassation in Hifnairevs. Tandon
-the report of whose judgment is appended to one of the briefs of
the appellants.
The annuities created to establish an asylum for the poor and a
school farm-and of the validity of *hich grave doubts exist-aie
charges upon the legacy of the cities. If the directions of the
testator cannoi be legally complied with, the charge will be remitted
without defeating the legacy. Say. Roman Law, § 120-9.
We shall not express any decided opinion in reference to the annui-
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ties, but leave the question of their validity to be settled by the
persons interested, or by the tribunals to whose jurisdiction they
appropriately belong.
We have considered it our duty to examine the several questions
which arise upon the record, so that the important interests involved in them may be relieved from further embarrassment and
controversy. In our opinion, the failure of the devise to the cities
would not have benefitted the appellees; for that, the limitation
over to the States of Maryland and Louisiana would have been operative in that event.
We close our opinion with expressing our acknowledgmentd for
the aid we -have received from the able arguments at the bar, and
the profound discussions in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, with
whose judgment we have concurred.
The decree of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana-is reversed, and the cause remanded to that Court, with
directions to dismiss the bill of the plaintiffs, with costs.

.District Court of the United States for the Maryland Jistrict.
Speclal Bessin, February,1854.
UNITED STATES VS. THE B3ARQUE ANNA.
1. The limitation of two passengers for every five tons of a vessel's measurement,
by the 1st and 2d sections of the Passenger Act of 1819, has been repealed by the
10th section of the Act of 1849.
2. No conviction can be had under the Passenger Act of 1847, except whpre an
illegal number of passengers has been taken on board at a foreign port, with the
intention to bring them into the United States, and where uch illegal number has
been actually brought in; or where an illegal number has been taken on board at
a port in the United States, with the intention to transport them to a foreign port.
The mere intention to violate the law, formed in a foreign country, and not completed by the illegal importation, is insufficient.

UNITED STATES vs. THE BARQUE ANNA.
3. In the determination of the liability of a vessel, under the PassengerAct of 1847,
the Court will be guided by her custom house measurement, which has been delivered by the Surveyor of the port to the master or owner of the vessel, in proference to any subsequent measurement on the part of the Government.

-e

4. The term ,,personal luggage," in the Act of 1847, only includes wearing apparel,
bed and bedding of the passengers, required for their comfort and convenience of
the voyage, and does not extend to furniturb, stores, or other articles not necessary for their personal convenience.
5. The principles by which the Court will be guided in the determination of the
cases under the Passenger Act of 1847.

This was a libel filed by the District Attorney of the United
States, to enforce a forfeiture, under the acts of Congress passed in
relation to pas.senger vessels. The facts fully appear in the opinion of the Court.
'William .Meade Addi8on, (U. S. District Attorney) for Libellants.
Me8rs. Brown and Bume for the Claimants.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GmEs, J.-The case of the United State8 vs. the BarqueAnna,
belonging to Bremen, has received the careful consideration of the
Court, since its adjournment. Its trial occupied the attention of
the Court for twelve days, and I do but justice to the learned counsel engaged in it, when I say, that the investigation has been
conducted 'throughout, with a learning and ability, and an industry fully commensurate to the large amount depending on its
issue, and the important interests connected with it.' The Barque
Anna was seized by the Collector of this Port, on the 24th of December last, for an alleged violation of the Acts of Congress passed
in reference to passenger vessels. She was claimed to be -forfeited
by the 2d section of the Act passed 22d February, 1847.
That sectioii reads as follows:." That if the passengers so taken
on board of such vessel, and brought into, or transported from the
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United States aforesaid, shall exceed the number limited by the
last section to the number of twenty in the whole, such vessel shall
be forfeited to the United States aforesaid, &c."
The said Barque was also claimed to be forfeited under the 2d
section of the Act of 1819, entitled " An act relating to passenger
ships and vessels," and which act limited the number of passengers
to be carried in any vessel to two for every five tons of the custom
house measurement of such vessel. The seizure was regular, and no
question has been raised in reference to it. The libel in this case
was filed by the Attorney for the United States, to enforce the forfeiture. And I understood him to contend,
1st. That the limitation of two passengers for every five tons of
the vessel's measurement has never been repealed.
2dly. That the offence consists in taking on board, at a foreign
port, more than the legal number of passengers, although the vessel
may not bring more into this country than the legal number.
3dly. That the Court must be guided- in the investigation and determination of this case by the actual measurement of the Barque,.
made since her last arrival here, by witnesses who have testified on
the trial; and that the Government is not bound by the' custom
house measurement of said Barque, a dertificatt of which had been
given by the surveyor of the port to-the captain of said Barque.
4thly. That the term a personal luggage," in the act of 1847,
must be confined to such articles as are ordinarily used and required
by emigrant passengers on voyages of this kind, and cannot be
construed to include furniture, stores, or other articles not requisite
for their personal convenience on the voyage.
During the trial, the captain of the barque was offered as a witness by the claimants, but he was objected to by the Attorney for
the United States on the ground of incompetency. His testimony
was, however, taken, subject to the exception that the Court might
have time to look into the question. I have done so; and am
clearly of the opinion that he is not a competent witness in a case
of this kind. Whatever might be the rule of law on this subject
in a proceeding in rem, instituted by a private suitor, and of which
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I say nothing, I think that in a case of seizure for a violation of
any of our revenue or other acts of Congress, where the offence
consists in the wrongful act of the master of the vessel, and where
the judicial sentence'or decree is conclusive, not only with respect
to the thing seized,'but also with respect to the incidental rights
and responsibilities of the parties concerned, the master is not a
competent witness. And in my investigatian of this case, I have
not referred in any manner to the testimony of the captain.
The first law in relation to passenger vessels was passed on the
2d of March, 1819. It provided, as I have stated, that no vessel
should bring from any foreign port into the United States, or
transport from the United States to any foreign port a greater
number of passengers than two for every five tons of any ship or
vessel, according to custom-house measurement. The trade of the
importation of passengers was then in its infancy, and the legislators of that day never dreamed of the manner by which their good
intentions would be frustrated, And the objects they sought by the
enactment of that law wholly defeated. As the Jaw contained.n'o
limit to the amount of freight to be brought in passenger vessels,
and as the freight was always first taken in, it became the practice
to get all the freight you could, and then crowd in the passengers
afterwards. Ship fever and death was the-consequence to hundreds
of the victims of this imposition, until the humanity of the nation
was aroused, and it appealed loudly to Cpngress in 1847 for further legislation. That appeal was answered by the passage of the
act of that year, to which I have already referred. - That act came
from the Judiciary Committee of the House, and was reported by
Mr. Rathbun, of New York, no doubt after a careful review of
the many facts of imposition which the history of this trade into
the port of New York for several years preceding, .afforded. It
prot ected the passenger by requiring the ship owner or master to
afford'him a certain space of superficial feet, varying in extent, according to the deck he occupied, for the accommodation of himself
and his perso~al luggage. But. it still retained the limitation of
two passengers to every five tons of the vessel's measurement. It
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was found in the course of that year, that in many cases where passengers were taken on board a vessel, and the Space required by the
act of 1847 fully given to them, their number would exceed the
proportion of two to every five tons. And as Congress thought
that the protection given to emigrants by the act of 1847 was full
and ample, if faithfully enforced, by the 10th section of the act of
1848 they repealed the limitation of the act of 1819. The attorney for the United States contends that this section only repeals
"the first secti6n of the act of 1819," and not the second section;
but the first is the section that virtually contains and prescribes the
limitation, and the second merely forfeits the vessel if this limitation be exceeded by the number of twenty passengers. This barque
cannot, therefore, be forfeited under that act.
Now, in reference to the second point made by the learned prosecutor in behalf of the Government, what are tie provisions of the
law of 1847? The first section of said act, leaving out for the
present all that part which speaks of stores, luggage, &c., reads
thus: " That if the master of any vessel, &c., shall take on board
such vessel at any foreign port or place, a greater number of passengers than in the following proportion to the space occupied by
them and appropriated for their use, on.the lower deck or platform,
one passenger for every fourteen clear superficial feet, &c., with
intent to bring such passengers to the United States, and shall
leave 8uch port or place with the same, and bring the same or any
number thereof, within the jurisdietion of the United States
aforesaid."
And the second section provides "that if the passengers so taken
on board of such vessel, and brought into or transported from the
United States, &c."
The Court think that under this law, no conviction can take
place, except where an illegal number of passengers has been taken
on board at a foreign port, with the intention. to bring them into
the United States, and such illegal number has been brought in, or
where an illegal number has been taken on board at a port in the
United States, with the intention to transport them to a foreign
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.port. In the former case the court would have no right to convict
for the mere intention formed beyond the jurisdiction of the United
States. The intention must be carried out by the illegal importation into this country. Even if the law were doubtful, we should
not so construe it, as to make Congress violate the law of nations,
and attempt to punish offences committed. beyond the jurisdiction
of the country.
.But the court deems the language of the law clear, beyond, all
question upon this subject. The word "so" in the second section
upon which the learned counsel for the United States ielied to support his view, obviously refers to the "intention to bring into or
transport from the United States" as mentioned and specified in
thb first section. In reference to the third oint, to wit: By what
measurement is the court to be guided in ascertaining-the capacity
of the vessel for passengers ? it appears clear to the court, that
whenever the officers of the Government have measured .the vessel,
ascertained her capacity, and giveil that result to the captain upon
which he has acted, the Government would be bound'by it. It
appears by Captain Barnes' testimony, page 80, and also by the
testimony of Captain McDonald, that it is the usage and practice
of the officers of the Government at this port, to measure all
passenger vessels, where they have not been -previously measured
at some other port of the United States, and to give to their masters
a certificate of said measurement. Now, this practice would bind
the Government, except where it would come in conflict witli the
provisions of the law on the subject.
For this principle, I refer to the case of the United States vs.
Tillebrow, to be found in 7th Peters' Supreme Court Reports, page
28. Bnt if no usage had been proved, I should still hold 'that the
proper measurement was the one made by the surveyor of the port,

and under his direction, and on which the 'master and owners of the
vessel had acted. For, as no one is designated by the law of 1847
to make the measurement, if we do not take the custom house measurement, by' what measurement shall we be guided? By the
measurement in a foreign port, or by the measurement of any ship
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carpenter employed by the master here? We have seen enough in
this case to show us that this rule would lead to great confusion.
In the regulation of vessels coming into our ports, to be examined
and inspected by our officers, to ascertain whether they have complied with our laws, Congress must have intended that the capacity
of these passenger vessels should be ascertained and declared by
the same officers whose duty it may be to enforce the penalties for
their violation. We must take the custom house measurement,
therefore, where 'no part of the space usually allowed to passengers
is occupied by cargo, stores, &c., but where. the whole space forTierly measured is not appropriated to and used by the passengers.
Barnes proves that' it is the practice of the boarding officer to measure the space actually occupied by them. The master must, at
his peril, see that in the space actually allotted to the passengers
in the particular Voyage, he attempts to carry no more than that
space would contain bythe custom house measurement, after deducting for the spaces he may have thought proper to occupy with cargo,
stores, &c. To enable him to make this calculation, it is usual for
the boarding officer, when he makes his first measurement, to furnish the master tith a diagram of his vessel, showing her capacity
for passengers in sections. The captain of the Anna was furnished
with such a diagram. By that diagram, which the captain had
with him since 1851, and which was made for him by Captain
Barnes, then the official measurer of vessels at this port, it appears
that the'two spaces forward and aft, enclosed by the supposed bulkheads, would contain 534 superficial feet, equal to 88 passengers,
leaving 154 passengers for the middle space.
By Captain Barnes' diagram, marked R. C. B., and made by
request of the counsel of the claimants in this case, the middle
space between the bulkheads contained 2083 superficial feet, equal
to 149 passengers, and "the spaces within the bulkhead contained
608 superficial feet, equal to 43.passengers. This was made from
the data furnished by the custom house measurement.
By Mr. Abrahams' calculation, the capacity of the vessel between
the bulkheads was 2122 superficial feet, equal to 151 passengers,
and the spaces behind or eiclosed by the bulkhead contained 479
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superficial feet, equal to 34 passengers, and making the whole
number 185.
By the measurement made by Messrs. McDonald, Barnes and
Abrahams, it appears that the middle space contains 2074 superlcial feet, equal to 148 passengers, and thle spaces back and for)Yard of the bulkheads contain 527 superficial feet, equal to 87
passengers. So that it appears by any and all of these diagrams
and calculations, the middle part could not be made to contain legal
space for more than 154 passengers at the outside. She then carried
and brought into this country 20 over the number; and is forfeited
by the Act of 1847, if the Court is satisfied from the testimony,
that the space forward of the supposed bulkheadr was not appropriated to and used by the passenigers; or, at least that space was
not left therm for at least one or more passengers. And here, before
I.discuss the testimony in reference to this part of the Case, it is
necessary to settle what is included in the term "personaZ luggage,"
used in the Act of 1847.
The term "luggage" is used in England, as I am informed,'in
the same sense in which we use the word "baggage" in this country.
Now, it has never been ascertained with certainty what things may
or may not be included in the term baggage; but I should suppose
it would be limited to such articles of necessity-or personal convenience as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use,
and would not include merchandise or other effects. For this construction, see Story on Bailment, sec. 499; 9 Humphreys (Tenn.)
Reports, 622; 11 id. 419; 5 Cushing, 69; 25 Wendell, 459.
And more particularly is this construction required for this Act, in
which the word "personal" is placed before the word "luggage."
Congress was aware that these emigrants frequently brought with.
them articles of furniture, agricultural and mechanical instruments,
and determined, by the passage of this act, that none of these things
should occupy a part of, or interfere with the space of the vessel
which was required to be appropriated for the use of each passenger
on the voyage. I shall therefoie always hold, in the construction
of this, passenger act, that the term "personal luggage" only
includes wearing apparel and bed and bedding of the passengers
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required for their comfort and convenience -on the passage. Any.
other construction, it appears to me, would defeat the wise and
humane views of the legislature in the enactment of the law. The
learned counsel of the claimants, by the course of their examination, sought to enlarge the construction of these words, so as to
include all articles which the passengers were permitted to bring in
duty free. But it will be found, on an examination of the Tariff
Act of 1846, that many articles are admitted with the passengers
free of duty thai could not come under the classification of "per8onal luggage" in the most liberal construction of that term.

Now, having settled the construction to be given to these words
in the Act of 1847, let us look at the testimony in the case. And
here I approach the only part of the cause which has given me any
embarrassment. The testimony is apparently contradictory-and
I have felt, during my examination of this testimony, more disposed
than ever,.to sympatlhize with juries who are called upon so frequently to reconcile or draw their deductions from conflicting evidence. But in the review of this testimony, I have been guided by
what I consider to be two leading rules of evidence. 1st. That in
all cases of conflicting evidence, the first step in the process of
inquiry should be, to ascertain whether the apparent inconsistencies
which it presents, may not, without violence, be reconciled; and if
not, to what extent and in what particulars, the adverse evide'nce is
irreconcilable.

-

And 2dly. That in case of conflict of testimony, the greater
weight should be given to the testimony of those witnesses whose
position gave them the best opportunity for observation.
Now, by the testimony in the case, what was the condition of the
forward part of this vessel between decks on her last voyage ? The"
Government has produced ten witnesses in all, only one of whom,
Dr. Palneyer, undertakes to speak of its condition when they left
Bremer Haven and on the passage. Eight of these witnesses,
Messrs. McDonald, Pickering, Williams, Winter, Bosley, Burrier,
Collier and Pitts, are custom-house officers at this port, and only
saw the vessel after her arrival here. And of all these, Captain
McDonald is the only one *ho speaks of what was contained in the
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"forward space at the quarantine. He boarded the barque on the
19th, at quarantine, bit did not measure her until the 21st of
December, after her arrival at the wharf. Mr. Pickering did not
see her until the 28d December. Williams does not speak of the
condition of the foriard space until he held the line to measure the
vessel on the 21st, and then he says "he did not look over the
casks to see what was behind them." Bosley took no particular
nQtice.of what was -forward. Collier saw nothing forward. Barrier never went below until the vessel arrived at the wharf; and
then he cannot say what was behind the casks. Pitts did not
examine what was behind the forward bulkhead, and Winter only
saw a few casks forward.
Mrs. Pahmeyer never went below until the morning of the
vessel's arrival at the wharf. And Dr. Pahmeyer's testimony
presents this contradiction: that when the vessel left Bremer Haven,
the space forward'was pretty full of tierces, chests and casks-and
yet he says, that after the siorm he saw a great many more there.
Besides, I could not rely upon the testimony'of a professional mai
whose memory is so treacherous that he could not recollect the
names of the patients whom he hid attended, or the name of the
lawyer whom he had employed in what he considered an important
cause; Now the claimants have. proved by twelve witnesses who
were in the vessel for nearly two months, and who were passengers
between decks, and, therefore, must have seen this part of -the
barque daily; that when she left Bremer Haven, there was nothing
forward but one or'two passengers' chests, and that subsequently
when they had left England they encountered a storm by which
water got into the lower hold and wet the passengers' chests and
casks that were there. They were brought up, their clothes and
bedding dried, and then put forward with two casks of potatoes;
but that the space was at no time full or anything near full. That
they could at all times go round the casks and forward of them;
and march about there for exercise. And that there was no rope
or cargo there: They are confirmed-in this statement by the mate
and cook of the barque.
Now, may not all this testimony be reconciled without imputing

UNITED STATES Ts. THE BARQUE ANNA.

perjury to any one? I think so; and I think the mate's testimony
gives the key to unlock this apparent difficulty. He says, that
there were a few passengers' chests forward when they left England,
that more were placed there after the storm, together with the two
casks of potatoes, and that after they arrived at quarantine and a
part of the passengers were gone, they began to clean up between
decks, and he placed in the forward space some ropes and several
barrels. Albert Christopher also testifies to the placing the rope
there after the afrival of the vessel. Ernest Schultze testifies that
there was no rope in that space forward on the voyage; that he left
the Anna the day she came to the wharf; that he went down.to the
vessel the next day to get his things; that he went between decks
and he took notice that the state of thihgs about the foremast was
not the same as before, different articles were taken away and
other things put there that were not there before. Another witness speaksof their taking down the berths, and one of the witnesses
for the Government speaks, of seeing boards forward between
decks. They were no, doubt the boards of the berths which had
been taken down. Now from this testimony can the Court say
that this forward space was entikely occupied, atid the passengers
had no use of the same?
It contained 262 superficial feet, equal to 18 passengers. Now,
place there all the boxes of which any of khe witnesses have spoken,
say 80, and you'would not fill but a little more than one-third of
the space. Add to them the three casks, and you will still have
more than half of the space vacant, or legal capacity for nine
passengers. Now, can a conviction -be justified upon such testimony? -The burden of proof is upon the Government in a case
like this, and if the mind of the court is. in doubt; it should not
enforce the forfeiture. If this forward space had been filled up
with cargo, the government could have shown it by Mr. Cole, the
inspector, who discharged the vessel. They have failed to do so,
and have not proved a case entitling them to a decree of forfeiture.
I will therefore sign a decree dismissing the libel filed in this
case.

COMMONWEALTH vs. JOHNSTON.

-In the Supreme Court-ofPenstania.
THE COMMONWEALTH -VS. JOHNSTON.
1. Special pleading before a Jus 'ice of the Peace, though not to be encouraged, is
not unlawful, and when a defendant has pleaded specialy, and the plaintiff demurs to his plea, the facts therein alleged are regularly on the record, and become
substantive ground of the judgment.
2. In-a-conviction under the Act of 22d April, 1704, for performing worldly employment on Sunday,.it should appear what the work was for whioh th# defendant
was convicted, bt as the whole record is to be taken together, it is sufficient if
the derscription of the work appear in any part of it.
3. Driving an omnibus as a public conveyance daily and every day is worldly employment, and not a work of clarity or necessitywithin the meaning of the Act of '94,
and therefore notlawful on Sunday.
4; "Acontract of hiring by the'nionth does not, in gxeeisa bind the hireling to work'
-on Sundays, and-if his-word be such-as the Statnteforbids, an express agieenkeiLt
to peform it on~unday will not protect him, for such a contract is void.
5. Tbough travelling. doesnotin a legal sensd tall within tlie-description of worl*
employment intended to be prohibited, let the runningof p7hic conveyances in"
Sunday is forbidden by the Statute. Br,4c,'C3.
I and Lazwx J. dissentiog.'-

The following dissenting opinion was delivered by
BwicK, Ch.J.-The defendant, Johnson, was convicted, before an
alderman, of violating, the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, in
"Ariving certain horses, to which- was attached an omnibus, in
which certain persons- were carried over'the streets of the city of
Pittshurg, and from the said city over and along certain roads withinthecounty of Allegheny."
It is impqrtant that the laws which- relate to thts offence should be
properly administered. A general suspension of ordinary 'employment at regularly iecurring periods, is universally admitted to have
good 6ffects on the physical, moral and pecuniary conditioni of the
people. It is for these worldly reasons alone that the law of 1794
was made. N6 sane man can read thfe constitution and believe that
I Vide ante, p. 285,

for opiion of the court.
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the government has' a. right to eiforce the observance of this or any
other religious, duty as sfoh'.,The statute is',capablel of being perVerted.by.a loose construction
to purposes for which it was "neerintended Being the.only point
of possible contact !betwebn-the ChUrch and th 'State, it is natural
enough that some who hdve it" fully. learhed 'the iiportant principle" of. toleration, should desire'to. make it. hiib-hard. Besides, it
happens unfortunately thafrsthis is. the Veryllubject; on'bicl the
opinions of the .'everal se&tW are 4t the greatest ihrignce. .So6&
believe that thb.-denunciationd df the Ol. Testarn~n tgait
the vi4latioi" of Saturdayare in: full force against those, ho'o not~'rest
on Sunday,-andthat a Christian: is"bound t6 keep 'the lafte-Just:as
a Jew did, the former., Others adopt this opini on onlyji'atf(thdy
call:thelwirst day of.the. weak by the Jewish anme for ,he-vMVth;
but, think -that. the'spirit" of. Chitianity bai-"xuc-h.-bttigaite.,fthe
severity of. tiie:old lao.. A third vlass tret it as. Wweekly fesw
val the' church, at wich the resurrection 6f its Fouiddr is. to .'k
solemnly, celebrated, :b,kttepudinte utterly The ndti6n tiat.4t has any
connection with, or "anology-to, the ..Mosaie Sabbath.' -ITlis- atte'i
party is subdivided between those itho hold, that theArihrseeidentlf
great event which the, doy commemortres should -b&'h~nored by'ces
sation~from,labor aswell as by acts -.of special- worship, and others
who maintain that their duties are. fulfilld.tby .the'appropriaie .reli
gious -ceremonials ltg e. There are :nianypersons' agpij who. at
clear that -one',,day is-.'not mare 'holy lhaii .anbtheri who' pro4e"
to-have trace the ,oxigin~of the contrmy.-custom to the'decroo"*ff
Roman ]mperor in tb third century, and. wh6 stoutly6pposetheniselves to all. those doctrines and commandUiehts of

ioie, by. whioh

the original purity of the divine revelation 'has, in" theii opinion;
been corrupted, ,BeQsides elM these, hze isanother numerous"iand
respectable Christiau,sebt, whose :exemplaiy.moral 6ha'viorofind
devoted 'piety give: their ,feelings a fair*claim, to be considerATheir doctrine is, that the fourth .'commandment .in.the decalo'gu
was never changed .nor. repealbd.' .-They teach (and -as far astliey
are permitted, they practise. fvhat theyteach) that Sundry'is 6n:6 of
the six days on 'which they aro commanded to labor and do all. theii
•28

COMMONWEALTH vs. JOHNSTON.

wock. To them the seventh 'day is theS Jhbath of -the Lord their
God. The universal privilege of privat'judgmat enjoyed in-hi
pountry Lao :1Oku y created, aui endless. vari6ty -ofopitions among
%rt$x, gt withave-with to-and of -us-still others (the -Jew fot
stauve).whp ;fait'wiii this snl6&bt ii neither.difived from, nor in
,4cootd~tie wW
t hich is 4kight in -the NeW 'Testamenit.
aWe
re not tmdeeide Ietree*ntheieoonffieting-doctrines. Te
l", otoct, th*00msli lbmt Iaopts .noua as a fivorite. It regaw&
lho
sincere. pfossors -ofevery faith with .eqatleye, and leaves een
Ake iA of yqpoiay to be.pUnished by.,Him.who'aloze known the
ecreto of- t~w. heart.- The government his no miore authority on

thq

tion of: observing the first day of the week than it has on

tlh
qo4hIr fiztes opolemio theology , ;:
It-may wsowell lattempt, ,to
ac,.
um
s on ..theduties of. prayer, devoutmeditation,
lptkm
etu haxt iponxthis. Udigmi.onbt.vay desirable
,we.i al
ilsRe of.ne
ue
d,on- bujecuWldohoi~itereat us so
4 ep~y, . ;k iv~aiall such.. e ummation.'~e zefeted? The exarivehetof lb*Ibrce:hls been ftllytridd; aAd ig" fla failure.
T .nrofli~hasbeen governed with very littlewisdom. Its political
ditoy4ntiraeometo-that of our own tcountry, is almost ani unbroken recordLof ;er.rors and:sf wrongsf fBut. of all blunders, the
mest prepo eteus is the offort -to advance religiods truth by State
!&vor; 4n4 of &lt'rarnk,the most Irutal,- bl&d iad '"ivolting is
4 tsL
*hich punishes &,mmn-forthesincere oonvictions of his hear.
RA I
r donbtlessbeeA iLpelied-o doit vei$oft.dh b: 'the best

tniv

"zMao

4uam~4amtth," Walamtatgsm
aid Philip

-V,,;fhentol-that his peee4tons would makb the Yifw Cointries a
,Wrfte;,and the English kovernment may-haveonly Aesired the sal.avs"-of the Irish, when it hanged and slaughter4 themz by thousouds,. and:confiscated. their :property, for houistly-adhering to an
otlawd_ faith. Such lenevolence -produdes precisely the same
effect asi.the most maligiiant hatred. I admIt that there is -agreat
ierence between burnifig a man, to -depth at a slow fire, and compelling him t6 pay a fie, so small that a-laborer, by diligence and
self denial, can make it up in a month. But the difference is only
in degree. It was to extirpate the prineiple of intolerance that our
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Constitutions provided that "No human authority can in any case
'whatever control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no
preference shall be given by law to any religious establishment or
mode of worship."
Those among us who believe that the institution of the Jewish
Sabbath has been engrafted on the Christian system, and changed
from the seventh to the first day of the week, have a right to propagate their doctrine. But they must do it by moral means-by
appeals to reason and conscience-by their own example of an uprighi walk and conversation in life-and by charity to those who
differ from them. They must get their arguments from revelati6n
(if they can) not from the statute book. Religious truth asks no
favor except that of its natural freedom. The absurdity of planting
an oak in a hot-house is not more palpable than that of sheltering
Christianity under legal enactments. It needs no forcing glass. It
demands the stimulus, of no artificial heat. By the power of its
truth -it will conquer the world: but it rejects the unworthy aid
which the arm of flesh is so prone to offer. .Non tali au&xilio, nee
defensoribus i8t8e.

If the act of 1794 be not construed according to the spirit of
that religious liberty which the constitution guaranties, the construction must inevitably be wrong, and will lead to the worst
consequences. We need not fear a union of Church and State;
of that there is no danger. But the best interests of the country
depend much on the reverence of the people for the religion
which is taught among them. Any thing which is calculated to
bring Christianity into contempt is a deep public injury. And how
can that be done more effectually than by clothing it in the coarse
rags of human legislation, patched up and forced on by judicial de:.
cisions ? Any advaiitage given by law to one sect over others, is
an irreparable injury to the party so favored. It will naturally be
construed into an admission that.it has no vital truth to sustain it.
We live among a people who scorn all contrivances to fetter the
mind. Statutes are necessary for some purposes, but nobody in this
country believes them to be inspired. Justices of the peace and aldermen, judges, sheriffs, and constables are useful in their way, but
they are not called and sent to preach any system of theology what-

486

COMMONWEALTH. Ts. JOHNSTON.

.ever. Convictions and executions, fines and imprisonment, will
never be accepted as arguments, by any American, who .has sense
enough to know his right hand from his left. It is far better, even
for the denomination we may desire to help, that every man should
be fully persuaded in his own mind, and then suffered to act according to his honest convictions. Of course, if his opinions prompthim
to do what is injurious to his neighbor, the law should stop him.
But I hold, that the essence of republican liberty consists in this:
that every citizen may do as he pleases, in regard to all those things
which concern nobody but himself. And with due deference to the
Maajority, who seem to think otherwise, I submit, that if I choose to
go to church, or even to a heterodox meeting, in a three cent omnibus instead of a carriage hired for three dollars, or bought.for a
thousand, it is,nobody's business but mine, and neither. I nor the
man who drives me ought to be punished for it.
These are general principles, which up to the present time, have
never been violated by this Court. I am willing to go -now as far
A, our predecessors have ever gone. But the affirmance of this
judgment takes a wide leap beyond that mark. It clears the bounds
of natural justice, and leaves all precedent out of sight behind it.
It fines a man for carrying decent and -good citizens to religious
meetitgs, and to other proper places, where, heretofore, it has been
thought they had a right to go. It denounces as criminals, punishable by law, those men and women who go to church or visit the
graves of their friends, or take the air on Sunday, and whose poverty
compels them to go by the cheapest mode of conveyance.. It is
true that those who rode in the omnibus are not convicted; but no
sophistry can make a distinction between the sin of the agent and
that of the persons who employ him and participate in his acts.
Let us look more particularly into the case before us.
There were pleas, replications and demurrers filed. All this was
something worse than useless. The alderman could not enroll them.
A party accused may have his ground of defence stated on the record, as was (one in Specht vs. The Commonwealth, 8 Barr. But
the decision of a magistrate on sharp points of special pleading
would be a very unsafe reliance in the execution of the law.
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The evidence is also returned. Neither have we any legal right
to notice it. A bill of exceptions is the only means by which evidence can be made part of the record so as to bring it before a
Court of Error; and a bill of exceptions before an Alderman is as
novel as a demurrer.
This case, therefore, like all others of the kind, must stand or fall
by the naked record of conviction.
In these summary proceedings the magistrate acts both as judge
and jury. To allow them at all is a violation of the great fundamental principle of jurisprudence, secured in England by Magna
Charta, and here by the Constitution, which requires that every
man shall be tried by his peers. Therefore, all intendments are
against such a record. Whatever does not appear on it is taken not
to exist. When it leaves room for a presumption, that presumption
is always in favor of innocence. The statute must be strictly pursued
by the justice: "otherwise," says Burn, "the common law will
break in upon him, and level all his proceedings."
The act of 1794 furnishes a form of conviction under it. If that
form be followed, perhaps a particular description of the work or
labor done may be omitted. This is not a case which involves that
point. But when the justice does undertake to describe the act
committed by the accused party, and that description shows him to
be innocent, I had hoped that no court in Pennsylvania would sustain the conviction. Suppose, for instance, a man were convicted
of breaking the Sabbath by preaching the gospel, or burying the
dead, or nursing the sick, it ought clearly to be reversed, because it
is manifest from the whole record taken together, that the magistrate's conclusion of guilt was erroneous. So, also, where the offence
is set out so equivocally that it cannot be known whether the act
was innocent or guilty; .thus no plausible argument could be made
in favor of a conviction for rapidly moving one's hands up and
down on Sunday, without saying whether the defendant was pitching hay or gesticulating in the delivery of a sermon. A person
may violate the Sabbath by walking from one place to another, if
he were walking for a wager; but he may also walk without being
guilty of any offence. A record which charges him with no more
than walking, charges him with nothing.
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In the case before vs the alderman has very properly incorporated
into his record of conviction the act which the &sftnA&nt had douf,;
so that we might review it. He gives his ow judgmnt that the
defendant is guilty, but he offers us the prem.seo and lease us to
draw our concusious, and say whether his was riht or wroug. Let
us see what it is. The defendant is accusecaud cquvicitd of dri ing certain horses attached to an omnibus iAwhK4 oortahi persons
were carried. This is 'the.whole head and front of his offending.
Whether this was a crime or. not depends oz; Qotsb circumstances
not stated. If .he was carrying the paseuggrs to %bull-b4it or a
horse race, it was a. scandalous viqlation of Jaw-and m ora.; but if
he was taking them to a camp-meeting, or a funeral, or to some
other proper pla p, e did no wrong, and to punish him would *oe an
outrage on comumon justice. What are we to infer from a record like
this ? Xqt guilt; fqr. the presumption of 1.aw is -in fTor of innocence, an4 the record does not contradict it.
e aldermnu having
stated the faots, we must accept them as being trulystatid ccoring to the evidWe. Here, then, is a man sentenced for a ocujlnil
offence, without accusation and without pr9o4 that either heoor-the
persons with him,: did, or -intended doing, anything i4 the smallest
degree unlawful.
Under the circumstances here disclosed, it is not only the legal,
but the natural, presumption, that those permons yore ab~put no
guilty act, nor bent on any evil purpose. The inhabitants of Pittsburg and its environs- are "as moral and religious a people as any
other on the globe, of equal numbers and living within 4imflar limits.
A fair ma~u of sound judgment (.o say nothing of hristian charity,) who would see a score of unknown persons passing in or out of
the city on Sunday, would take it for granted, without any aid from
the rules of law, that they were not going to perpetrate any crime.
It will not do to say that this presumption of innocence is repelled by the alderman's judgment pronouncing the act an-unnecessary worldly employment.
This is only his judicial conclusion
from the evidence. We, having, before us the same materials for a
judgment, are not forbidden to differ from him. If it be true that
the judgment of conviction is conclusive, though against the palpa-
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ble truth of the case as set out 'on the record, then a justice of the
peace may convict a man of anything which, in his ignorance or
bigotry, he may choose to call sabbath-breaking, no matter how innocent it may be in the eye of the law. Opinions on this subject
are very various among the eight or ten thousand inferior magistrates of the State. One justice would convict without hesitation
for an act which others would pronounce entirely harmless. Beside.s,
this law presents questions of real dificulty, about which the most
learned lawyers 'have differed many a time, and will again. The
citizen has no security except in having the law applied to the facts
of his case by a tribunal competent to do it. But this, it seems,
we must avoid for the future. Even when an alderman or justice
of the peace doubts whether it is right or wrong to go to a place of
public worship in an omnibus, but inclines to the latter opinion, and
yet fearing that he may do injustice, puts the whole case fully and
truly on the record for the purpose of having it reviewed, we can
do nothing but astonish him and all who know him, by declaring
his opinion infallible. If this be the true view of the subject, why
should a party be mocked with a writ of error?
I think no lawyer will say, when the facts on which a summary
conviction is based are set forth on the record, that they ought to
be taken more strongly against the defendant than a special verdict
would be in a common law indictment. And when was a special
verdict like this ever sustained? Or what court of error ever listened to an argument on the propbsition that the judgment of the
inferior tribunal was conclusive of the defendant's guilt when the
facts, found and placed on record, proved him to be innocent?
I am of opinion that this conviction ought to be quashed, because
it is on its face a conviction for nothing worse than decently passing
along a public road on the first day of the week, a privilege which
is and ought to be enjoyed by every man, woman and child in the
commonwealth. The presumption is, that the defendant and the
persons with him were going about their proper moral and religious
duties. I do not believe that it Is worse to ride in an omnibus than
in any other vehicle, nor that a man who holds the reins and guides
the horses is more wicked than they who profit by his skill. I think
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a coachman 4ho takes his emplbyerls family toohel
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the act of 1794; and I can male no dtistinaotion bktween thmta&se
and this.
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omnibuse' ireised' ontho .rht dky bf:the'reeklfili n pses*which
are not only innod~ntjbtit lzierithrions - i(¢asA i-tliy. !ITr e
inhabitants df'Lwrenceevileprefer a, reside'nce thdri foi redihi of
taste, econoifiryheilth. : But ibeiig a mreresuurb'6f Pittsbtft,
their business duwinj the'4eek, and hii religious dities oi S iniday,
reiquire most of' themi to be in thb6 aty. -Thdotvenienc 4-'M
omnibus line to Marry thim ihd 'their: fatailies -to* hurch was a
motive which'is'pived to haiefinupneed at4Itst soiteiof tIheln; in
the selection-of that pla6e. '.Withoit this,-mode 'of conv~yahce,
tbere.are great numbers who 'woola be whrlly deprited of4 Ilt ecclesiastical 'communioi vitfi the feople. of their ownfaith -forthey
have no churches oi meetinghbusesun tsreriIimew than Pitsburgti,
they are not able to keep 6afriagei, and tlhe roads are" enetally in
a conait6n.wliicbrmakes travelling on oo.t-.difficiilt for_:anybody,'
and impossible Mor wbmen,.childreh and porsons of infirm 'health.
Mehuse of th omnibuses bytiese persons and by, others who go to
visit the grave6 of: their friends, and :by some who leave" the smoke
of the 'ity to breathe for a brief space ' purer atmosphere in the
woods'and fields, constitutes the full sum of the immoralities com-
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plained of. This is proved by the testimony of a dozen most unimpeachable witnesses, all of whom are called by the informer himself.
The whole business is conducted with the utmost propriety. One
person only testifies that on a single occasion, long ago, he had
heard swearing in an omnibus. The proof is full that all disorderly
persons were turned and kept out. It is certainly not improbable
that among the many persons who use this conveyance for such
purposes as I have mentioned, an occasional sinner in disguise may
have been admitfed, and used it for travelling on worldly or unlawful, 9nd, for aught I can say, criminal business. But, surely it is
better that a wicked man should be left to the punishment which
will in time overtake him, than that the innocent should suffer for
his offence. The agent of the line swears that the vehicles are run
on Sundays with special reference to the hours at which the religious congregations assemble and dismiss, and not either as often
or at the same times as on other days.
Notwithstanding the necessity thus existing for a line of cheap
conveyances to carrythe people back andforth between Lawrenceville
and Pittsburg, all the drivers were prosecuted, as if they had been
detected in the perpetration of some great bnormity. When the
prosecutions failed with one alderman, they were renewed before
another. 'What motive prompted the effort to deprive the people of
Lawrenceville of the means which had been previously at*their
command, of worshipping God in -the way their consciences told
them was right, I do not pretend to judge. But whether it be
done by infidels to injure the Christian congregations generally, or
by bigots of one church to break down another, it is equally a perversion of the law and of the gospel. If any portion of our people
hold the privilege of going to church inlan omnibus, when that is
their only means of:getting there, at the mercy of every profane
scoffer or blinded sectary who chooses to make an information,
then freedom of conscience is in a worse condition than I thought it
was.
It may be answered, that though it was proper enough for the
passengers to go to church or to the cemetery, or into the country
for health and-recreation, the defendant himself was engaged in his
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ordiuary calling, and therefore is guilty. This mode of putting the
case isvery superficial, to say the least of it. When it is proper
for one zuan to do an act which he cannot accomplish without assistance, *uother may aid him. A person charged with doing worldly
empioymont on Sviiday, may plead his neighbor's need for it as
well as his :own. The fact, that.he does it for hire, makes no difference. A calling, profession or trade*may be exercised on the first
day of the week for money, if the public welfare or private necessity
d6muds it. Thus the apothecary sells drugs on that day, the
phypician attends the sick, the undertaker buries the dead, the
setzo. opens the church-all in pursuit of the business by which
they earn their bread-and they justify their conduct, because it is
necessary, not to. themselves, but to their customers.
If, therefore, it be lowful for men to go and come to church and
elsewhere on the first day -of the week, he who bears them over the
mud or snow is as innocent as they are. In ministering to their
necessities he brings 1imself within the exception of the statute, as
clearly as if his own safety or convenience depended on it. The
half dime which his customers pay him for carrying them to the
church, is no greater sin than the contribution expected .fr6mthem
when they get there to the preache2's salary.
The very point was ruled by the Cqurt in Logan vs, .Matthew8,
6 Barr, 417, that.what a man may lawfully do by himself, he can
do by the assistance of another. The keeper of a livery stable, in
the exercise of his ordinary business, hired a horse on Sunday to a
person who used it to visit his father. The contract was declared
to be lawful. And why? Because there was nothing in the law
to hinder or forbid such a visit. Since no law hinders, men from
going to church or visiting a buryimg-ground, or taking the air, it is
lawful, on the principle of the case referred to, for an -omnibus
driver to furnish them the means of doing so.
I give to the word neemsity the broadest definition. Nothing is
necessary which is not indispen8able. But different things may be
necessary as means to different, ends; one thing is necessary to
life, another to health, another to decency, another to comfort,
another to intellectual improvement, another to moral' culture,
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another to spiritual progress; and all these ends being lawful,
whatever is necessary to effect either of them, is a necessity within
the meaning of the law. To the health, comfort and decency; to
the moral, mental and religiou improvement of these people, a
cheap, rapid and ever ready mode of conveyance is an absolute
necessity. To compel them to remain imprisoned within their
houses on Sunday, is odious tyranny. To allow them to go out
only on condition that they trudge through the mud and endure the
rains, is absurd, as well as cruel. What would be thought of an
order to close the bridges and tie up the boats, lest the people of
Allegheny should commit the sin of going to church dry, instead of
swimming across the river?
Numerous omnibuses, hacks and carriages, running through a
populous city, may become a nuisance. When this is the case the local authorities may properly regulate them, or stop them altogether.
But of this the people themselves are the best judges.. The city
authorities, representing the people, have not thought proper to do
so in Pittsburg.
In Jones vs. Hughes (5 S. & R. 299), it was held that.travelling
was not within the act of 1794. The correctness of this decision
has never been questioned. All the legislation of the Commonwealth has proceeded on the principle then established. The State
government carries passengers over her own canals and railways
every Sunday, and regularly provides by law the means of doing
so, keeping for that purpose officers, agents and laborers in her
constant employ. There is more walking and riding done on the
first day of the week than any other. Persons who cannot go out at
any other time, go then. The whole population is in motion. Not one
in ten thousand thinks it his duty to keep within doors, and perhaps
no man inthe Commonwealth is so completely saturated with bigotry,
that he would prevent tie people from moving about from place to
place, if he could. The worst that malice itself can allege against
those who rode in an omnibus, No. 11, on the 1st of September, is,
that they were going where they pleased in a decent and orderly
manner, and for purposes of which the propriety and lawfulness
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have not been questioned. What the driver did, was to furnish
them with the necessary means of doing so. If the authority of
Logan vs. Matthews is not to be overturned, and common sense
upset along with it, the driver and passengers were alike innocent
of every offence, except, perhaps, that of patronizing the wrong
church.
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lIn the -District Court for the it~y qpd*uZ
BECKER V8. LEVY.

1. The removal of the maker and jndorser of. a promissory note into another juris-

diction after the execution of the ihstrumen,

rid dispense with theecessity of.

presentment and notice of non-payment.
2. It seems, that the indorsementof a note by ona

pArtyto it,jnthe Absence ot

evidence of any particular intention, authorizes the pWyee t9 write over is name
any form of engagement he may see proper. "

P. . Brightly], for plaintiff.
JT. A. Phillips, for defendant.
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The opinion of the Court, in'which the facts appear, was delivered by
SHiaRswoo, P. J.-The note sued on was drawn by one6- Tateur

to the order of the plaintiff, and was indorsed bytthe defendant,
without any previous indorsement by-the plaintiff. In Ky ner vs.
Shower (13 Penn. St. Rep, 444), it was heldy that when a person
who is neither maker, drawer, payee or accejtor, puts his nume on
commercial paper, in the absence of.eviaence -ofwhat was the particular intention of the parties, he authorize the payeb'to write over
his name any form of engagement he may 6ee proper. 'And the
authority of that case, to that poini, is recognized -in Campbel vs.
Knapp (15 Penn. St. iRep. 30). Taking it, however, to be an
indorsement, according to Taylor vs. MoCune (11 Penn. St. Rep.
460), in which it was held that the blank indorsemdnt of a note by
-

